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ABSTRACT 
 
Fingerprint is widely used in a variety of applications. Security measures have to be 
taken to protect the privacy of fingerprint data. Cancelable biometrics is proposed as an 
effective mechanism of using and protecting biometrics. In this paper we propose a new 
method of constructing cancelable fingerprint template by combining real template with 
synthetic template. Specifically, each user is given one synthetic minutia template 
generated with random number generator. Every minutia point from the real template 
is individually thrown into the synthetic template, from which its k-nearest neighbors 
are found. The verification template is constructed by combining an arbitrary set of the 
k-nearest neighbors. To prove the validity of the scheme, testing is carried out on three 
databases. The results show that the constructed templates satisfy the requirements of 
cancelable biometrics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As one of the most popular biometrics, fingerprint has a long history of usage in crime 
investigation. In modern days many fingerprint databases have been built and are 
utilized in a variety of commercial applications. These databases become the targets of 
hackers. Compared to non-biometric information, biometric information cannot be 
replaced easily. If a fingerprint database is stolen, the fingerprint templates could be 
used to conduct identity theft or impersonation. Therefore, it is extremely important to 
protect the database. However, it is a challenging problem to protect biometric data with 
existing security techniques. Unlike password, biometric data cannot be secured with 
cryptographic one-way hash function due to the non-exact reproducibility problem. 
Biometric data can be encrypted. However, decryption is required upon recognition, 
during which it can be stolen. 
 
Ideally, it is desirable to design a security mechanism that can easily revoke a 
compromised template and reissue a new template based on the same biometrics – 
cancelable biometrics. According to [1], cancelable biometrics must meet the following 
four criteria: 
 Diversity: distinctive templates can be generated from the same biometric data. 
                                                                                         
  
 Revocability: if a template is compromised, it can be replaced with a new one based 
on the same biometric data. 
 Non-reversibility: it is infeasible to recover the original template given a transformed 
template. 
 Accuracy: matching with transformed template does not lower recognition accuracy. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2 briefly reviews literature; 
Section 3 introduces the procedures and steps of synthesizing templates, generating the 
verification templates, and matching templates. In Section 4, we give the results of 
matching. Section 5 summarizes the paper and points out possible future research 
direction.  
 
2. Related works 
In recent years, numerous researchers have approached the problem of generating 
cancelable biometrics. The key to cancelable biometrics lies in template transformation.  
Ratha et al. [2] proposed three techniques to transform biometric template, including 
image morphing, block scrambling, and domain mapping. Ratha et al. [3] [4] proposed 
generating cancelable minutiae templates with the following three different 
transformations. In the Cartesian transformation, the minutiae space is divided into size-
fixed and sequentially numbered cells.  In the polar transformation, the coordinate space 
is divided into sequentially numbered polar sectors. The process of transformation is 
done by changing the positions of the cells in Cartesian transformation and sectors in 
polar transformation. In the surface folding transformation, certain locally smooth but 
globally not smooth functions (ex., the vector function for an electric potential field) 
are applied to change minutiae positions.  
 
Moon et al. [5] proposed a template protection method by using a set of secret-key 
defined rectangles to move the minutiae points. Wong et al. [6-8] developed a so-called 
multi-line code for transforming and securing minutiae template. Jin et al. [9] proposed 
a template protection technique by transforming minutiae template through minutiae 
vicinity decomposition and random projection. Lee et al. [10] proposed using its local 
orientation information to rotate and translate each minutia. Chikkerur et al. [11] 
transformed each minutia using its neighboring local texture. Zhang et al. [12] 
transformed minutia using its Cylinder Code - a local structure based representation. 
 
Yang et al. [13] proposed approach of generating cancelable fingerprint templates by 
transforming the derivative features of pair-wised minutiae since the local features such 
as distance and relative angles between two minutiae are more robust against distortion. 
References [14-18] also utilized pair-wised minutiae to generate new features. 
 
Tulyakov et al. [19] and Li [20] proposed a scheme for transforming biometric 
templates based on minutiae triplets. Sandhya [21] [22] proposed an approach of 
generating cancelable fingerprint templates by deriving new features from the Delaunay 
triangles formed by minutiae triplets. Similar schemes are proposed with Delaunay 
quadrangle [23] [24], pentangle [25], and hexangle [26]. Sandhya and Prasad [27] 
                                                                                         
  
proposed a template protection method by transforming a structure formed by each 
minutia and its k-nearest neighbors. 
Ang et al. [28] proposed a key-based cancelable template generation method, in which 
the key is used to reposition minutiae. 
Teoh et al. [29] proposed a cancelable template generation method named biohashing, 
in which the template is represented with a fixed length vector. A user-specific 
tokenized random number is used to generate a random base containing orthonormal 
pseudo-random vectors, and the inner products of the template vector with every 
pseudo-random vector are binarized based on a threshold to generate the transformed 
template. Belguechi et al. [30] proposed a similar approach. 
As pointed out by Nagar et al. [31], there are two drawbacks with biohashing when the 
key is known to the adversary: the matching performance degrades due to the 
quantization of features and dimensionality reduction, and the original template can be 
recovered. 
 
3. Proposed scheme 
 
In this paper we propose a novel approach of constructing cancelable fingerprint 
minutiae template by combining a synthetic template with a user’s real template, as 
shown in Fig. 1. Specifically, each user is given a synthesized template (ST). Every 
minutia point from the user’s real template (RT) is individually thrown into the ST, 
from which its nearest neighbors are found and collected. The verification template 
(VT) is constructed by simply combining a set of neighbors. Note that VT is a subset 
of ST (i.e., VT ST), which consists of randomly generated minutiae points and there 
is no common minutia between RT and VT (i.e., RTVT=).  
 
The verification template constructed with this approach satisfies the four requirements 
of cancelable biometrics: 
 Diversity can be achieved by using different ST; 
 Revocability can be achieved by changing ST; 
 Non-reversibility: VT does not contain any real minutia. It only contains 
randomly generated minutiae.  
 Accuracy: our testing results with three databases show that the verification 
templates can produce higher matching scores than the corresponding real 
template. 
 
In this paper we use the k-nearest neighbors when mapping real minutiae to synthetic 
(random) minutiae. Since inter-class variations have been taken into account by using 
strong random number generator to generate the different synthetic templates for 
different users, we believe other minutiae mapping methods may also be utilized as long 
as they preserve the intra-class variations in the real template. Future research will be 
conducted in this direction. 
 
Since a user’s VT contains only randomly generated minutia points, we anticipate that 
this approach may not suffer from the record multiplicity attack, as described by Li and 
                                                                                         
  
Hu [32], if the following two conditions are met when constructing multiple VT for a 
user: 
(1) Use different synthetic templates generated with strong random number 
generators; 
(2) Use different nearest neighbors when selecting minutiae for the verification 
template.  
 
For example, the 1st nearest neighbors from ST1 are chosen to construct VT1, the 6th 
nearest neighbors from ST2 are chosen to construct VT2, and the 11th nearest neighbors 
from ST3 are chosen to construct VT3. Then the random minutiae in VT1, VT2, and 
VT3 will not reveal much information about the real minutiae they associated with.  
 
Specifically, three numbers (x, y, and θ) associated with every minutia are 
independently generated with PRNG. The ranges of the two coordinates (x, y) are given 
based on the original dimensions of the fingerprint image. The orientation angle is set 
between 0 and 360. A synthesized fingerprint template consists of N synthetic minutiae, 
as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of transforming minutiae template (N > M, Random Number 
Generator). Note that the acronyms (RT, ST, and VT) are used as singular or plural, depending 
on the context. 
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In this paper the fingerprint templates are matched with the Bozorth algorithm as given 
by Wilson et al. [33]. It consists of three major steps: 
Transform a minutiae template into an intra-fingerprint minutia comparison table (CT) 
In a template, for each pair of minutiae, a five-variable entry including the length (d) of 
the line segment between the two minutiae (α1, α2) and the angles (β1, β2) between 
each minutia and the line connecting the two minutiae, is made into a CT.  
Two CTs are constructed from a pair of to-be-matched fingerprints. One is called the 
registered CT and the other is called the query CT. 
Construct inter-fingerprint minutia compatibility tables 
Compare each entry in the registered fingerprint’s CT to the entries in the query 
fingerprint’s CT. If the differences (d) between the lengths of the two segments and 
those of the corresponding angles (β1, β2) are smaller than or equal to the predefined 
thresholds, an entry representing the two pairs of minutiae will be made into the inter-
fingerprint minutia compatibility table.  
Traverse the inter-fingerprint compatibility tables to obtain a matching score between 
the two fingerprints.  
 
More details about the Bozorth matching algorithm can be obtained from NIST 
Biometric Image Software [34]. All the matching results in this paper are obtained with 
this algorithm. 
 
In the field of biometrics recognition, the performance of a system is often characterized 
with False Matching Rate (FMR) and False Nonmatch Rate (FNMR) or Equal Error 
Rate (EER) by selecting arbitrary thresholds. Instead of using these rates to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed approach, it is sufficient to use the database-based average 
matching scores (together with standard deviations) to compare the accuracy before and 
after template transformation. Higher the average score, higher the accuracy is. 
 
4. Experimental results 
We carried out experiments with three publicly available databases (listed in Table 1) 
to test the feasibility of our proposed approach. Upon designing the experiments, we 
attempt to answer the following questions: 
(1) How does the size N of the synthetic templates affect matching performance? 
(2) How do different sets of nearest neighbors affect matching performance? 
(3) Does the approach result in false match? 
(4) Can the proposed approach survive multi-generation transformation? 
 
The results are given below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                         
  
 
 
Table 1. Database information 
Source 
 
FVC2004 FVC2006 PolyU 
Database DB1 
(DB1A+DB1B) 
DB2_A DBII 
 
Reference [35] [36] [37] 
Sensor type Optical Optical Optical 
Image size 640x480 400x560 640x480 
Resolution 500dpi 569 dpi 1200dpi 
Dimensions of ST 640x480x360 400x560x360 640x480x360 
No. Fingers 110 140 148 
Images/per finger 8 12 10 
Imaging sessions 3 1 2 
Avg. minutiae count 58  18 121  27 136  47 
Avg, matching 
score* 
56.9  44.6 45.8  29.9 71.2  54.2 
*Matching score is obtained by matching two different templates from the same 
  finger. 
 
4.1 DB1 from FVC2004 
The DB1 contains 880 real templates obtained from 110 fingers. One synthetic template 
is paired with each of the eight real templates pertaining to a finger, which gives eight 
synthetic-real pairs for each finger. For each pair, six different verification templates 
are constructed with the 1ST, 2ND, 3RD, 4TH, 5TH, and 6TH nearest neighbor, respectively. 
Matching is carried out only between two verification templates constructed with the 
same nearest neighbor. Average scores and standard deviations are calculated based on 
the entire database. The results are plotted in Fig. 2, from which we can see that the 
maximal average matching score is obtained when N lies between 100 and 200. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Average matching score with DB1 
                                                                                         
  
 
 
Table 2 gives the matching results between RT and VT. The low average scores indicate 
the verification templates are significantly different from their real templates. 
 
Table 2. RT vs. VT (N=200) 
 AVG STD 
1ST 1.33 1.65 
2ND 1.73 1.69 
3RD 1.90 1.72 
4TH 2.04 1.71 
5TH 2.16 1.73 
6TH 2.26 1.68 
 
 
4.2 DB2_A from FVC2006 
 
The DB2_A contains 1680 real templates obtained from 140 fingers. The average 
matching scores are listed in Table 3, from which it can be seen that the average 
matching scores reach the maxima when N is around 150. 
 
Table 3 Matching results with DB2_A 
N 1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 5TH 6TH 
50 48.6 66.5 77.9 82.6 87.8 92.3 
75 73.7 98.9 112.2 120.9 129.2 134.3 
100 93.0 122.2 133.9 151.4 154.3 162.9 
125 106.7 138.6 157.5 168.9 177.7 184.2 
150 116.6 149.4 167.9 177.8 184.9 188.1 
200 128.7 155.0 166.0 170.2 170.1 170.9 
300 128.7 138.8 138.5 136.7 135.0 133.6 
400 116.9 116.6 115.8 114.4 112.0 108.9 
500 105.8 103.8 101.3 98.7 96.4 95.5 
600 94.9 91.4 88.8 88.4 85.7 83.6 
800 79.8 78.1 75.9 74.0 72.2 71.1 
1000 69.9 67.7 66.6 64.5 62.2 60.7 
1200 63.0 60.8 58.5 56.5 54.6 53.4 
2000 43.8 43.6 41.5 39.7 38.0 36.0 
3000 35.8 34.1 31.5 30.1 28.2 26.6 
4000 29.9 28.3 26.0 24.5 23.0 21.2 
 
                                                                                         
  
 
Since the average matching score of RT is ~45.8. Therefore, VT perform better than RT 
when N is in [50, 1200]. 
Table 4 gives the matching results between RT and VT. The low scores indicate that 
VT are significantly different from RT. 
 
Table 4 RT vs. VT (N=200) 
 AVG STD 
1ST 1.43 1.62 
2ND 1.84 1.63 
3RD 2.11 1.63 
4TH 2.24 1.61 
5TH 2.32 1.60 
6TH 2.39 1.60 
 
 
4.3 DBII from PolyU 
The DBII contains 1480 real templates obtained from 148 fingers. One synthetic 
template is paired with each of the 10 real templates pertaining to a finger. For each 
pair, six different verification templates are constructed with the 1ST, 2ND, 3RD, 4TH, 5TH, 
and 6TH nearest neighbor, respectively. The results are plotted in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Average matching scores with DBII 
 
From Fig. 3, we can see that the results of DBII are similar to those of DB1 (4.1) and 
DB2_A (4.2). Therefore, a common conclusion can be drawn that the proposed 
approach can achieve equivalent or better performance with proper selection of N and 
L. 
                                                                                         
  
 
In order to answer the question whether the proposed approach can survive multi-
generation transformation, we utilize the 1ST generation verification templates 
constructed with N=1000 and L= 6TH as the real templates to construct the 2nd generation 
templates. For the 2nd generation verification templates, four different nearest neighbors 
are selected: 1ST, 6TH, 11TH, and 16TH. The matching results are summarized in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 Matching of the 2nd generation VT 
 N 1ST 6TH 11TH 16TH 
100 124.0 158.0 161.4 166.9 
125 153.9 187.5 190.1 192.8 
150 169.8 201.8 204.5 202.4 
175 185.3 208.1 208.1 205.3 
200 186.3 201.8 199.2 200.5 
250 180.5 182.8 183.6 182.9 
500 137.8 138.9 136.9 135.9 
1000 116.6 113.2 115.3 113.0 
2000 101.9 98.3 98.6 97.1 
4000 90.5 88.8 88.1 87.7 
8000 84.5 83.7 83.3 82.3 
16000 81.8 81.5 80.7 80.2 
32000 80.3 79.9 80.3 79.8 
64000 79.6 79.5 79.2 79.5 
 
 
From Table 5 it can be seen that the average matching scores of VT are higher than that 
of RT (71.3) when N is in [100, 64000]. Maximal scores are generated when N is around 
175. 
The matching results of VT for both generations are given in Fig. 4, from which it can 
be seen that the 2ND generation templates perform better than the 1ST generation 
templates when N >500. With N >2000, the ranking of the average matching scores is: 
2ND generation templates >Real templates >1ST generation templates 
  
 
 
                                                                                         
  
 
 
Fig. 4 Effects of N on two generations 
 
The cross generation matching results are given in Table 6, from which we can see that 
the cross matching score increases as N increases. To avoid possible cross matching 
(i.e., to reduce the possibility of reversing VT), it is necessary to select N < 4000 and L 
 6. 
Table 6 Cross generation matching results* 
 N p6c1 p6c6 p6c11 p6c16 
100 0.67 0.95 0.96 0.96 
125 0.98 1.35 1.40 1.42 
150 1.36 1.74 1.64 1.77 
175 1.68 2.06 2.04 2.04 
200 1.94 2.30 2.29 2.33 
250 2.34 2.58 2.63 2.70 
500 3.29 3.35 3.39 3.38 
1000 4.49 3.73 3.77 3.79 
2000 8.76 4.03 3.98 4.01 
4000 23.25 4.47 4.29 4.17 
8000 57.55 5.34 4.66 4.34 
16000 114.85 9.79 5.98 5.00 
32000 191.88 23.35 11.15 7.51 
64000 287.29 58.18 26.32 16.89 
*p6 is the 1ST generation template, c1, c6, c11 
and c16 are the 2ND generation templates. 
                                                                                         
  
 
The matching results between the 2ND generation sibling templates are plotted in Fig. 5.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Inter-sibling matching results 
 
Based the results given in Fig. 5, we believe that cautions must be taken if one chooses 
to construct the cancelable templates just by changing L. To be on the safe side, both 
ST and L should be changed when constructing new VT for a user. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper a novel approach of constructing cancelable fingerprint template is 
proposed. Verification template (VT) is constructed by minutiae-wise connecting a real 
template (RT) to a PRNG generated synthetic template (ST) using the k-nearest 
neighbor method. VT is a sub-template of ST and satisfies the requirements of 
cancelable biometrics: 
 Diversity: distinctive templates can be generated by using different ST. 
 Revocability: a compromised template can be replaced by changing ST. 
 Non-reversibility: it is infeasible to recover the original RT given VT because the VT 
only contains random minutiae. 
 Accuracy: matching with VT does not lower the recognition accuracy when N and L 
are chosen properly. 
 
According to the results obtained with three publicly available databases, matching 
between two different VT originated from a same finger produces the maximal score 
when the ST contain 150 ~200 minutiae. 
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The proposed approach can be utilized to transform RT across multiple generations. 
With proper selection of N, 2ND generation VT can generate higher matching score than 
RT and 1ST generation VT. 
Cross-generation matching (parent-child matching) can be avoided by restricting N (ex., 
N<8000) and/or by using a large L (ex., L= 16). Cross-sibling matching (child-child 
matching) is possible. Caution must be taken when constructing multiple cancelable 
templates just by changing L (i.e., without changing the ST.). 
For better security, both the synthetic template and the ordinal number L should be 
changed when constructing a new template. 
In this paper we focused on k-nearest neighbor based minutiae mapping method. Future 
research will be carried out on finding other mapping methods.  
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